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  1. Erlang/OTP
  2. ERL-356

Consider modern cryptography

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    Details

    • Type: Improvement
    • Status: Resolved
    • Priority: Major
    • Resolution: Won't Do
    • Affects Version/s: None
    • Fix Version/s: None
    • Component/s: crypto
    • Labels:
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      Description

      Erlang/OTP is currently using OpenSSL to provide is cryptography features. However, there are a lot of ways that OpenSSL's API can be misused easily by well-intended developers that don't possess a background in cryptography engineering.

      Some examples:

      • Using `RAND_bytes()` in an application that forks, since it isn't the OS's CSPRNG.
      • Encrypting with AES-ECB or AES-CBC mode, without a MAC.
      • Encrypting with AES-CCM or AES-GCM and reusing a nonce (which is likely, given how small the nonce is for these modes).
      • Encrypting large messages with RSA in "ECB mode" (breaking the message into chunks and encrypting each message with the RSA public key independently)
      • Encrypting messages with RSA but using PKCS1v1.5 padding (see: Daniel Bleichenbacher's 1998 padding oracle attack)
      • Using Weierstrass curves for ECDH or ECDSA, and forgetting to validate that the point received are on the order of the curve. (This leaks your secret key.)
      • Using ECDSA and reusing a nonce. (Sony did this with the PS3 ECDSA signing.)

      An attractive alternative would be to use libsodium, for which bindings already exist. https://download.libsodium.org/doc/bindings_for_other_languages/

      With libsodium you get:

      • X25519 (ECDH over Curve25519), which is implements a Montgomery ladder construction and is constant-time. See RFC 7748.
      • Ed25519 (EdDSA over Curve25519), which uses deterministic nonces and is also side-channel-resistant. See RFC 8032.
      • Xsalsa20poly1305, which uses an extended-nonce Salsa20 so you can safely generate a 192-bit random nonce for each message and never worry about collisions. (Birthday collision: 50% after 2^96 messages, which can each be up to 2^72 bytes long. a.k.a. Not going to happen before the heat death of the universe.)
      • Argon2i for password validation and key derivation.
      • SipHash for hash tables.

      Furthermore, the API provided by libsodium lends towards a lower incidence of misuse. In pseudocode:

      key = randombytes_buf(32)
      nonce = randombytes_buf(24) /* or a constant */
      ciphertext = crypto_secretbox(plaintext, nonce, key)
      decrypted = crypto_secretbox_open(ciphertext, nonce, key)

      Public key encryption is handled by crypto_box() or crypto_box_seal(). All of these features are documented here: https://download.libsodium.org/doc/

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            Assignee:
            ingela Ingela Anderton Andin
            Reporter:
            paragonie-scott paragonie-scott
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              Updated:
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